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the traditional repair-reconstruction principles of the dissent, but found
reconstruction a reviewable mixed question of law and fact and on applica-
tion of the principles found repair."
The opinion of the majority of the Court doubtlessly reflects the general
attitude of the Court to the patent system. In recent years the Court has
been more sympathetic to the policy of the antitrust laws than tolerant of
the inherent monopoly of the patent system. The doctrine of contributory
infringement has been gradually weakened" until Mercoid v. Mid-Continent
ostensibly declared that it no longer existed." The undermining of the
General Electric rule that allowed a patentee to control his licensee's resale
price," by Cummer-Graham Co. v. Straight Side Basket Corp.," and United
States v. Line Material Co." and the intimations that abuse of the patent
right is per se violative of the antitrust laws," are indicative of the Court's
narrow view of the patent grant."
Thus the rationale of the present Court is but a further step in a contin-
uing judicial attitude on the part of the Supreme Court.
NEAL E. MILLERT
Securities—Withdrawal of Registration by Applicant Under Section
15(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.—Peoples Securities Com-
pany v. S.E.C.'—Peoples Securities was incorporated under the laws of
Texas for the purpose of underwriting a proposed 5100,000,000 offering of
shares of American Provident Investors Corporation. Pursuant to section
15(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 2 petitioner applied for registra-
tion as a broker and dealer in securities. After several postponements of the
effective date of registration by the Commission with the consent of Peoples,
the Commission, in accordance with section f5 (b) of the Exchange Act, 8
issued notice of public administrative proceedings to determine whether the
application should be denied because of alleged violations of the act.
In an effort to quash the inquiry, Peoples made several motions to cancel
53 Supra note 1, at 362.
54 Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 •.S. 502 (1912); Motion Picture Patents Co. v.
Universal Film Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1916); Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Develop-
ment Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931); Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488
(1942).
55 Supra note 44, at 669.
55
 United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
57 142 F.2d 646 (5th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 726 (1944).
58 333 U.S. 287 (1948).
50 See Schueller, The New Antitrust Illegality Per Se: Forestalling and Patent
Misuse, 50 Colum. L. Rev. 170, 184-95 (1950); Note, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 626 (1951).
eo This conclusion is a paraphrase of the concluding paragraphs of Note, Con-
tributory Infringement & Misuse—The Effect of Section 271 of the Patent Act of
1952, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 909-18 (1953). It seemed singularly appropriate.
1 289 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1961).
2 48 Stat. 895 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 780(a) (1958).
48 Stat. 895 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 780(b) (1958).
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or withdraw its application for registration, one of which was based upon
the fact that Peoples had since become legally dissolved as a corporation.
Each was denied by the Commission. The Commission continued the hear-
ings and found that Peoples should be denied an application for registration
because of willful violations of the statute' in that there were false and mis-
leading statements of material facts in petitioner's application and in two
additional amendments thereto. These findings are not contested. There were
no outstanding holders of American Provident Investors Corporation's
stock. Petitioners sought review of the Commission's order. HELD: Peti-
tioner's motion for withdrawal of its registration for application and dis-
missal of the inquiry was correctly denied.
There are serious disadvantages that accompany an order disallowing
an application for registration as a broker and dealer. Section 15A of the
Exchange Acts includes provisions for a limited amount of self-regulation
of dealers and brokers engaged in over-the-counter sales of securities. This
section provides for the formation of national associations of dealers with a
purpose of supervising the conduct of their members under Commission
scrutiny. At present the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.,
(N.A.S.D.) is the only association registered with the Commission under the
aforementioned section. The section also provides that the association may
stipulate that its members are precluded from dealing with non-members on
the same basis as they deal with each other, but, rather, must trade with
such non-members as with the general public.° The N.A.S.D. adopted this
provision. It is obvious that membership in the Association has strong eco-
nomic advantages since the members may sell at reduced rates and on differ-
ent terms among themselves whereas they are not allowed to do so with the
public generally. A further provision of section 15A 7 prohibits the admission
into a national association of any dealers or brokers who are the subject of
an order denying registration as a broker under section 15(b) of the Exchange
Act.° If, therefore, a registrant were able to halt the proceedings on the
question of the acceptance of its application prior to a final determination
by the S.E.C., it would still be eligible for membership in the N.A.S.D. and
be able to reap the advantages such membership brings.
The Court was faced with two major problems. Initially, it had to
contend with a 1936 decision by the Supreme Court seemingly contra and,
secondly, with the proper interpretation of certain sections of the Exchange
4 Ibid. The section empowers the Commission, after appropriate notice, to deny
registration to any dealer or broker if such denial is found to be in the public interest.
The basis for denial depends upon whether the broker, dealer, or any controlling person
therein has (1) issued or caused to be issued any false or misleading statements in the
application itself or in supplemental documents, (2) has been convicted of a crime
involving securities transactions within the past ten years, (3) is presently, permanently
or temporarily enjoined from engaging in securities transactions, (4) has wilfully violated
any provisions of the Exchange Act or the Securities Act of 1933.
5 52 Stat. 1070 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1958).
a Id. at (i).
7 Id. at (b) 4.
Supra note 3.
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Act. In Jones v. S.E.C.° involving the registration procedure under the
Securities Act of 1933, 1 ° the majority of the Supreme Court, speaking through
Mr. Chief Justice Sutherland, emotionally denounced the administrative
process," holding that an applicant's right to withdraw is absolute when
conditions are such that no interests will be affected other than his own. 12
Petitioner there had filed an application for registration but, when the Com-
mission ordered an investigation before the effective date of said application,
moved to withdraw it. The Court, analogizing the petitioner to a plaintiff
in equity, stated that he had the unqualified right to dismiss his complaint
unless some plain legal prejudice would result to the defendant other than
the mere prospect of a second suit upon the same subject matter." As in the
principal case, there were no holders of outstanding shares of the class of
stock involved in the registration statement. The Jones case received its
share of unfavorable criticism," but, nonetheless was often cited as precedent
for an absolute right of withdrawal of a registration application or for a
cancellation of an already effective registration statement."
However, the Jones case has been sufficiently encroached upon by both
Commission ruling and court opinions to leave its continued validity as a
precedent seriously in doubt. Whenever there were outstanding shares of the
securities under consideration sufficient public interest was found to preclude
an absolute right of withdrawal." For example, in Columbia General In-
vestment Corp. v. S.E.C.," the court had an opportunity to deal with this
9 298 U.S. 1 (1936).
10 48 Stat. 78 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77f (1958).
11 Supra note 9, at 23-25.
12 Id. at 22-23. Therein the Court states:
"In this proceeding, there being no adversary parties, the filing of the registration
statement is in effect an ex parte application for a license to use the mails and the
facilities of interstate commerce for the purposes recognized by the act. We are
unable to see how any right of the general public can be affected by the withdrawal
of such an application before it has gone into effect. Petitioner emphatically says
that no ,steps had been taken looking to the issue of securities, and this is not
denied. So far as the record shows there were no investors, existing or potential
to be affected. The conclusion seems inevitable that an abandonment of the appli-
cation was of no concern to anyone except the registrant. The possibility of any
other interest in the matter is so shadowy, indefinite and equivocal that it must
be put out of consideration as altogether unreal. Under these circumstances the
right of any person to withdraw an application for any other form of privilege in
respect of which he is at the time alone concerned."
13 Id. at 19.
14
 49 Harv, L. Rev. 1369 (1936); 34 Mich. L. Rev. 1031 (1936);
1019 (1936).
is Columbia General Investment Corporation v. S.E.C., 265 F
1959); Guaranty Underwriters, Inc., v. Johnson, 133 F.2d 54 (5th Cir
Corporation International v. S.E.C., 103 ,F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1939)
Trust v. S.E.C., 100 F.2d 888 (10th Cir. 1939); S.E.C. v. Hoover,
(E.D. III. 1938).
16
 Colum. Gen. Invest. v. S.E.C. supra note 15; Guar. Under. v.
15.
84 U. Pa. L. Rev.
.2d .559 (5th Cir.
. 1943); Resources
; Oklahoma-Texas
25 F. Supp. 484
S.E.C., supra note
17 Colum. Gen. Invest. v. S.E.C., supra note 15.
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precise issue. Rather than attempt to overrule Jones the court distinguished
the two cases on the ground that in Columbia there were 1800 shares of
stock already held by investors. Thus, there were other persons who had a
sufficient interest to preclude any absolute right of withdrawal. In addition,
the court pointed out that since the Jones decision there has been at least
one significant change in the law making an application for registration of
immediate concern to the investing public. At the time of the Jones case
the Securities Act of 1933, section 5,18 prohibited the offer for sale of the
securities involved in the registration statement until said statement was
effective. Under the 1954 amendments to this acti° a registrant may make
such offers to sell prior to the effective date of registration. As the court in
the instant case points out, 2° a registrant may make such offers to sell prior
to the effective date of registration, postpone the effective date several times,
issue a prospectus with misleading statements and then, if there were an
absolute right of withdrawal, simply withdraw his application before any
investigation could become final. Sales could then be made without utilizing
the mails or the facilities of interstate commerce. The registrant would
have derived his profits by the use of the very channels of the S.E.C.
Further, under Regulation A, 2 ' a sale of up to $300,000 of securities
can be made without the requirement of registration with the Commission.
In an attempt to safeguard this exemption the Commission has ruled that the
exemption is not available to one who has been the subject of a stop order
by the Commission within the immediately preceding five year period. 22
If the power to issue a stop order and complete an investigation is lacking
by reason of an absolute right of withdrawal the result is obvious. A
registrant might fully exploit the channels of the S.E.C. in his attempt to
bilk the public under the Regulation A exemption. However, despite this
cogent reasoning, the court in Columbia declined specifically to overrule
Jones, but, rather, used judicial restraint and distinguished the two cases
on the basis of the outstanding shares held by investors in the Columbia
case.23
In a further departure from Jones, subsequent courts have held that
if the Commission's stop order proceeding was instituted after the registration
became effective the registrant had no absolute right of withdrawal despite
the fact that there were no outstanding shares of the securities in question.
The vital distinction providing public interest was said to be the fact of
effective registration. 24
Thus, after a consideration of precedent, including the Jones case, the
Columbia case which distinguished Jones, and other cases which either dis-
18 48 Stat. 77 (1933).
19 68 Stat. 906 (1954), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (1) (2) (1958).
20 Supra note 1, at 274.
21 S.E.C. Reg. A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.254(a) (Supp, 1961).
22 Id. at § 230.252(c).
23 265 F.2d at 562.
24 Okla. -Tex. Trust v. S.E.C. supra note 15; Resources corp. Int. v. S.E.C., supra
note 15.
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tinguished or limited it, together with subsequent legislation, the court con-
cluded that an applicant has no absolute right to withdraw his registration
statement, whether or not there are existing investors. 25
Finally, the court had to interpret the Securities Exchange Act and its
application to the instant case. While Jones and Columbia arose under the
Securities Act of 1933, this case comes under the provisions of the Exdhange
Act of 1934. Section 15(b) of the Exchange Act provides that when the
Commission finds that a registered dealer or applicant for registration has
ceased doing business as such, the Commission "shall by order cancel the
registration of such broker or dealer."28 The petitioner argued that it is
mandatory, by the explicit language of the section, for the Commission to
cancel the registrant's application. It contended that by the use of the word
"shall", the Commission is precluded from the use of any discretion in
cancelling applications for registration when the registrant has ceased doing
business. The court recognized that "shall" often imposes a mandatory duty
but held that when applied to government action "shall" is sometimes the
equivalent of "may."27
 In view of the fact that "shall" is also used in another
part of section 15(b),28 and, further, that the cancellation provision appears
at the end of the section, the court decided that the word is used as a provi-
sion for clearing the Commission's files of applicants and dealers no longer
in existence as such and is in no way a mandatory directive.
The purpose of the Exchange Act is to regulate the exchange of securi-
ties involved in over-the-counter transactions, to safeguard the public from
misleading statements, and to prevent unfair practices by dealers and
brokers generally. As mentioned earlier the act provides for some self-
regulation of the dealers and brokers in over-the-counter trading." It is
clear that if the petitioner's contention that the cancellation provision of
section 15(b) were to be considered mandatory upon the Commission the
purpose and regulatory scheme of Exchange Act would be severely disrupted.
While unreversed decisions of the Supreme Court are binding upon lower
courts, they are "but evidences of the law and not the law itself."" Their
value as evidence may have been so eroded by subsequent judicial decision
and legislation as to make them valueless to someone urging their acceptance
as precedent. It appears that the Jones decision has reached this point in its
ill-fated history. The court properly held that today public interest is affected
immediately upon the filing of a registration statement, thus precluding with-
drawal without the Commission's consent, and further, that the use of the
25 Supra note 1, at 274.
25 Supra note 3.
27 Ibid. See also Richbourg Motor Co. v. U.S., 281 U.S. 528 (1930) ; Railroad
Company v. Hecht, 95 U.S. 168 (1877); West Wisconsin Railway Company v. Foley,
94 U.S. 100 (1876).
25 Section 15(b), supra note 3, also provides that the Commission "shall" deny an
application for registration if in the public interest and if the applicant is subject to one
of the disqualifications as set out in note 4 supra.
25 Supra note 5.
30 Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707 (1956).
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word "shall" in the cancellation provision of section 15(b) imposes no manda-
tory duty, but rather, allows discretionary policing action by the Commission.
PAUL L. BARRETT
Taxation—Deferral of Prepaid Receipts by Accrual Basis Taxpayer.—
American Automobile Association v. United States. 1—The taxpayer, a
non-stock membership corporation, kept its books on an accrual basis and
paid taxes on a calendar year basis. Its receipts consisted mainly of prepaid
annual membership dues, payment of which entitled a member to the availa-
bility of certain automobile services. Under customary accounting proce-
dure the taxpayer reported as gross income in the year of receipt only that
portion of the total prepaid dues actually received which ratably corresponded
with the number of membership months covered by the dues occuring within
the same taxable calendar year. In auditing the taxpayer's returns for the
years 1952 through 1954 the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue, in the
exercise of his discretion under section 41 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1939,2 rejected the taxpayer's system of accounting as not clearly reflecting
income. The Commissioner adjusted the gross income for the years in ques-
tion so as to recognize receipt of dues as income in the years actually received.
Consequently, a net operating loss claim for 1954 and corresponding carry-
back reductions were greatly reduced, and tax deficiencies were assessed for
1952 and 1953. In a suit to recover the deficiencies paid, the Court of Claims
sustained the Commissioners in the face of detailed "expert testimony" to the
effect that the taxpayer's treatment of prepaid receipts comported with
sound commercial accounting practices. By reason of a conflict between the
decision below and that in Bressner Radio Inc. v. the Commissioner,4 the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. HELD (5-4): The Com-
missioner was not wrong in requiring the prepaid annual membership dues
received by such a club to be included as income in the calendar year of
its actual receipt.
The Court concluded that even assuming petitioner's treatment of pre-
paid dues to be in accord with sound accounting practice, the case of Auto-
mobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioners is still persuasive authority for
1 367 U.S. 687 (1961).
2 A taxpayer's "net income shall be computed . . . in accordance with the method
of accounting regularly employed in keeping the books .. . but . . . if the method
employed does not clearly reflect the income, the computation shall be made in accord-
ance with such method as in the opinion of the Commissioner does clearly reflect the
income . • ." Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 41, 53 Stat. 24, 26 U.S.C. § 41 (1952).
See similar provision in Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 446.
3 181 F. Supp. 255 (Ct. Cl. 1960).
4 267 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1959). In this case the taxpayer, a retail television dealer,
long employing the accrual method of accounting, was permitted to defer inclusion
of income of prepaid revenue on twelve month television servicing contracts over a
twelve month period subsequent to date of receipt, since the method employed was not
shown to misrepresent income.
5 353 U.S. 180 (1957).
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